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ABSTRACT
We consider demand systems for utility-maximizing consumers facing general budget constraints
whose utilities are perturbed by additive linear shifts in marginal utilities. Budgets are required to be
compact but are not required to be convex. We define demand generating functions (DGF) whose
subgradients with respect to these perturbations are convex hulls of the utility-maximizing demands.
We give necessary as well as sufficient conditions for DGF to be consistent with utility maximization,
and establish under quite general conditions that utility-maximizing demands are almost everywhere
single-valued and smooth in their arguments. We also give sufficient conditions for integrability of
perturbed demand. Our analysis provides a foundation for applications of consumer theory to problems
with nonlinear budget constraints.
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1 Introduction
Economic consumer demand analysis traditionally starts from a utility function
that characterizes preferences, maximizes it subject to a budget linear in income
and prices, and obtains demands as functions of these budget parameters. A useful
extension starts from a probability over a field of preferences and obtains a condi-
tional distribution of demands given the budget parameters. A crowning achieve-
ment of neoclassical consumer theory is characterization in terms of expenditure
and indirect utility functions of demands obtained from utility maximization. This
allows development of utility-consistent demand systems for applications without
requiring constructive solution of the constrained optimization problem.1 How-
ever, this characterization depends critically on the envelope/duality properties of
optimization subject to a linear constraint, and is not immediately applicable to
non-linear budget sets. We tackle this problem by introducing utility fields with
linear additive marginal utility perturbations of a base utility function.2 Through
this device, we are able to establish conditions for consistency with utility maxi-
mization of demand systems for nonlinear budget sets, with the perturbation pa-
rameters playing a role analogous to prices in classical consumer theory.
Section 2 specifies our assumptions and gives an elementary envelope result
that provides a framework for specifying demand generating functions (DGF) for
a general consumer problem. This section also provides some further proper-
ties of DGF and demand that follow from utility maximization. In section 3,
sufficient conditions are given for a candidate DGF to be consistent with utility
1See Mas-Colell et al. (1995, Chap. 3D-H) and Varian (1993, Chap. 7.3-7.5). Diewert
(1974) gives mathematical details and historical references. In a nutshell, if v(t,p, y) is the
indirect utility function and e(t,p, u) is the expenditure function for locally non-satiated util-
ity with prices p, income y, and environment t, then market demand is given by Roy’s identity,
X(t,p, y) = −∂pv(t,p, y)/∂yv(t,p, y), and the net welfare gain from a move from (t′,p′, y′)
to (t′′,p′′, y′′) in money-metric utility at prices p and environment t is e(t,p, v(t′,p′, y′)) −
e(t,p, v(t′′,p′′, y′′)).
2Our approach follows Matzkin and McFadden (2011), where payoff tremble induced by per-
turbations is used to establish existence and regularity of Bayes-Nash solutions to continuous
games of imperfect information. These perturbations can be interpreted as translations of the gra-
dients of indifference curves, which may be of independent interest as the dual of the location
shifts of indifference curves associated with Stone-Geary and Gorman demand systems. For re-
lated use of perturbation methods in mathematical programming; see Rockafellar (1970), Birge
and Murty (1994), and Luderer et al. (2002). Where possible, we reference Aliprantis and Border
(2006), hereafter AB, for results that we use from mathematical analysis.
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maximization, and some results are provided to assist the derivation of DGF for
applications. Section 4 provides conditions for integrability of demand. Section 5
considers computation of the DGF in the case when utility has the Gorman polar
form. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
Acronym Definition
ACCM Axiom of Congruent Cyclic Monotonicity
DGF Demand Generating Function
GFFI Generating Function Fundamental Inequality
Table 1: Acronyms
2 An Envelope Theorem for Perturbed Consumers
Let S denote a convex body (a compact convex set with a non-empty interior) in
Rn+ that includes all possible consumption vectors and let T be a compact metric
space that indexes tastes, beliefs, and other attributes of the consumer’s environ-
ment that are not necessarily finite-dimensional. Consider a base utility function
U(x; t), where x ∈ S is a consumption vector and t ∈ T . Let ‖ · ‖ denote the
Euclidean norm on Rn, and let η(t, t′) denote the metric on T .
We form a utility field by adding a linear perturbation to base utility, U(x; t)+
m · x, where m is a vector of perturbation parameters that can be interpreted as
shifts in the marginal utilities of the commodities. The effect of this perturbation
on demand is not invariant under increasing transformations of U , so that further
analysis is conditioned on a particular ordinal representation of base preferences.
We will assume that m is contained in a closed ball M = {m ∈ Rn|‖m‖ ≤ c}
for some c > 0. We do not assume that U(x; t) + m · x is quasiconcave in
x, but when it is and c is sufficiently large, we show in the Appendix that as a
consequence U(x; t), and hence U(x; t) + m · x, are concave in x.
Let B denote a subset of the space of non-empty compact sets in S, interpreted
as the family of possible budget sets. Let
h(B′, B′′) = max
x′′∈B′′
min
x′∈B′
‖x′ − x′′‖+ max
x′∈B′
min
x′′∈B′′
‖x′ − x′′‖
3
denote the Hausdorff set metric on B; see AB 3.17. Assume that B is compact in
the Hausdorff set metric topology. We do not require the B ∈ B to be convex sets
or linear budget sets. Let [B] denote the convex hull of a set B.
Consider the problem of maximizing U(x; t) + m · x in x over a budget set
B ∈ B. Term X(m; t, B) = argmaxx∈B(U(x; t) + m · x) the demand mapping,
or when it is non-empty, the demand correspondence, and term V (m; t, B) =
maxx∈B(U(x; t) + m · x) the demand generating function (DGF). Term E(t) =⋃
(m,B)∈M×BX(m; t, B) the exposed set; it is the set of x ∈ S that are chosen for
some budget and some perturbation m. We call E(t) full if its closure is S. In
the classical case of linear budget sets B(p, y) = {x ∈ S|p · x ≤ y} with strictly
positive prices p and incomes y satisfying minx∈S p · x ≤ y ≤ maxx∈S p · x
let v(m, t, p, y) ≡ V (m, t, B(p, y)), and note that v is a classical indirect utility
function in (p, y). When B contains the classical linear budget sets and utility
is quasiconcave, continuous, and locally non-satiated in the interior of S, E(t)
is full. It may also be full for sufficiently rich families B even if utility is not
quasiconcave; e.g., the extreme case where B contains all singleton budget sets in
S.
As a consequence of maximization of perturbed utility, if x0 ∈ X(m0; t, B0)
and x0 ∈ B1, then V (m0; t, B0) + (m1 − m0) · x0 ≡ U(x0; t) + m1 · x0 ≤
maxx∈B1(U(x; t) + m1 · x) ≡ V (m1; t, B1). Rearranging gives
Definition 1 Generating Function Fundamental Inequality (GFFI): If m0,m1 ∈
M,B0, B1 ∈ B, t ∈ T , and x0 ∈ B1 ∩ X(m0; t, B0), then (m1 −m0) · x0 ≤
V (m1; t, B1)− V (m0; t, B0), with equality if and only if x0 ∈ X(m1; t, B1).
Summing the GFFI over a cycle of perturbations and budget sets gives an
analog for perturbed utility maximization of the conventional axiom of revealed
preference:
Definition 2 Axiom of Congruent Cyclic Monotonicity (ACCM): Ifmj ∈M,Bj ∈
B, and xj ∈ Bj+1∩X(mj; t, Bj) for j = 1, ..., J , where J ≥ 2 is an arbitrary in-
teger and (mJ+1, BJ+1,xJ+1) = (m1, B1,x1), then
∑J
j=1(m
j+1−mj) · xj ≤ 0,
with the inequality strict unless xj+1 ∈ X(mj; t, Bj) for j = 1, ..., J .
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When the Bj are all the same, the ACCM implies that X(mj; t, B) satisfies a
cyclic monotonicity condition (Rockafellar, 1970, chap. 24) that guarantees that
it is contained in the subdifferential of a convex function. When the mj are all
the same, the ACCM reduces to the Congruence Axiom of Revealed Preference
(Richter, 1966; Matzkin, 1991; McFadden and Richter, 1990).
The starting point for our analysis is an elementary theorem that summarizes
properties of perturbed utility maximization; all proofs are given in an appendix.
Theorem 1 (Envelope Theorem) Suppose U : S × T → R is continuous, M is a
closed ball, and budget sets B are contained in a compact (in the Hausdorff set
metric topology) subset B of the space of non-empty compact subsets of S. Then
[Cond. X] The demand mapping X(m; t, B) is a compact-valued, upper
hemicontinuous correspondence from M ×T ×B into S that satisfies the ACCM.
The exposed setE(t) is a compact-valued, upper hemicontinuous correspondence
from T into S.
[Cond. V] The demand generating function V (m; t, B) from M × T ×B into
R is continuous in its arguments; and convex, closed, and non-decreasing inm for
each (t, B). Further, V (m; t, B) and X(m; t, B) satisfy the generating function
fundamental inequality (GFFI).
[Cond. SD] The subdifferential
∂mV (m; t, B) = {x ∈ Rn|∀m′ ∈M,V (m′; t, B)−V (m; t, B) ≥ x ·(m′−m)}
exists for all (m, t, B) ∈ M × T × B, and is a convex-valued, compact-valued,
upper hemicontinuous correspondence satisfying [X(m; t, B)] = ∂mV (m; t, B)
and consequently X(m; t, B) ⊆ B ∩ ∂mV (m; t, B). Then, all extreme points of
∂mV (m; t, B) are inX(m; t, B). If, further, U is quasiconcave, thenX(m; t, B) =
B∩∂mV (m; t, B), and if in addition,B is convex, thenX(m; t, B) = ∂mV (m; t, B).
For each (t, B) ∈ T ×B, the subdifferential is almost everywhere (w.r.t. m) a sin-
gleton, and where it is a singleton, it is continuous and continuously differentiable,
and ∂mmV (m; t, B) = ∂mX(m; t, B) is symmetric and positive semidefinite.
Remark [Cond X] is the standard result that the demand correspondence coming
from continuous utility maximization in a compact budget set is upper hemicon-
tinuous, but here continuity with respect to the budget is characterized in terms
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of the Hausdorff distance between general budgets rather than Euclidean distance
between price and income parameters determining classical linear budgets. The
condition does not require thatU(x)+m·x be nondecreasing in x and locally non-
satiated, but if it is, thenX(m; t, B) is northeast exposed; i.e., if x ∈ X(m; t, B),
then x′ ≥ x and x′ 6= x imply x′ /∈ B.
[Cond. V] corresponds to the definition of an indirect utility function, but now
the dependence of this function on the perturbation vector m is emphasized, and
V is written as a function of the budget set B itself rather than as a function of
parameters that determine B.
[Cond. SD] establishes that for almost all m, the utility-maximizing demand
is a singleton that is given by the gradient of V with respect to m. Compare
this for a classical linear budget constraint with Shepard’s lemma giving Hicksian
demands as a gradient of the expenditure function with respect to price, and Roy’s
identity, giving market demands as a scaled gradient of the indirect utility function
with respect to price.
If continuity of U(x; t) is strengthened to Lipschitz continuity, the following
corollary establishes that the demand generating function is Lipschitz in its argu-
ments:
Corollary 1 Suppose S, U,M , and B satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 1, and
U(x; t) is Lipschitz on S × T . Then V (m; t, B) is Lipschitz on M × T × B.
Remark The usual way to define a (nonlinear) budget set B is to specify the
expenditure required to purchase x. Then B = {x ∈ S|R(x; pi) ≤ y}, where
y is income and pi is a vector characterizing costs that varies with the economic
environment. The neoclassical case is R(x; pi) = p · x, with pi = p. An impor-
tant application with nonlinear budget sets is study of progressive income taxa-
tion and labor supply; see Burtless and Hausman (1978), Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971), Gan and Ju (2011), Hausman (1985), Moffitt (1990), and tacitly Milgrom
and Segal (2002). In this case, y is the value of endowment income and enti-
tlements when the consumer does not work, R(x; pi) gives expenditure on goods
less net after-tax wages, and pi describes goods prices, the wage rate, and the in-
come tax schedule. Figure 1 illustrates a typical budget set for this application,
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with leisure on the horizontal axis, a consumption good on the vertical axis, and
a finite number of income tax brackets so that R(x; pi) is piecewise linear and B
is a (non-convex) polytope. Similar budget sets arise under block-rate utility tar-
iffs (McFadden et al., 1978; Nauges and Blundell, 2010), and under tax-qualified
savings programs (Beshears et al., 2010; McFadden, 2010); in the last case, a dis-
crete choice of owning or renting induces distinct nonlinear conditional budget
sets, so B is not necessarily connected. A generalization of the framework above
considers budget sets of the form B(pi,q; y) = {x ∈ S|R(x; pi) + q · x ≤ y},
where q is a vector of perturbations that behave like prices and can be interpreted
as net commodity-specific excise taxes. The Lagrangian for utility maximization
is L = U(x, t) + m · x + µ[y − q · x − R(x; pi)], with a first-order condition
(for an interior maximum when U is differentiable) ∂xU − µ∂xR = µq − m.
The demand generating function V (m; t;q; y; pi) is the optimized value of this
Lagrangian. Then singleton market demands satisfy X = ∂mV = −∂qV/∂yV ,
and V satisfies Roy’s identity in (y;q) even though there are additional nonlinear
expenditure elements in the budget. Also, from Theorem 1, X continues to satisfy
the subgradient property of V with respect to m.
Theorem 1 does not establish regularity properties for the demand correspon-
dence X(m; t, B) other than upper hemicontinuity in (m, t, B), the ACCM, and
almost everywhere single-valuedness and continuous differentiability in m. It is
known from the work of Katzner (1968) and Rader (1973a,b) that strong differen-
tiability and strict concavity conditions on utility are needed in the classical case
to ensure that X is everywhere continuously differentiable in the budget param-
eters. However, we establish that X(m; t, B) is almost everywhere Lipschitz in
t and B under much weaker conditions - smooth utility and a class of polytope
budget sets, defined next, that include economic applications such as labor supply
with progressive income taxes and demand given utility block rate tariffs that have
piecewise linear budget frontiers.
Definition 3 A polytope budget set is a finite union B = ∪Kk=1Ck, where each Ck
is a convex polytope; i.e., a non-empty compact set contained in S that is formed
by the intersection of an affine subspace (which may be the whole space) and a
finite number of half-spaces. LetW k ≡ {x ∈ Rn|Qkx = wk}, whereQk is ik×n,
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Figure 1: A polytope budget set
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denote the affine subspace spanned by Ck, and assume that redundant equality
constraints are eliminated so that Qk is of full rank ik. Let {x ∈ Rn|P kx ≤
yk}, where P k is jk × n, denote the intersection of half-spaces that complete the
definition of CkCk, and exclude from P k any column that is redundant because
the associated half-space containsW k. ThenCk has a non-empty interior relative
to W k; i.e., there exists an x ∈ W k such that P kx < yk. Let β = (β1, ..., βK)
denote the finite-dimensional vector with components βk = (Qk, wk, P k, yk); then
the polytope budget set B is finitely parameterized by β.
In the classical case of a single linear budget constraint, B is simply the non-
empty intersection of the non-negative orthant and a half-space in which positive
income determines the inequality constraint bound. Hence, in the inequality con-
straints P kx ≤ yk in the definition of Ck, yk can be interpreted as a vector of
”generalized income” bounds. Assume that if the inequality constraint bounds yk
define a non-empty polytope Ck, then strictly larger vectors y′k are also econom-
ically possible. Then, the set Y k of economically possible generalized income
bounds has a non-empty interior in Rjk . The role of the assumption that Y k has a
non-empty interior will be to ensure that the constraints Qkx = wk and P kx ≤ yk
fail to satisfy a linear independence constraint qualification for yk on a set of at
most Lebesgue measure zero. In specific applications, it will often be possible to
satisfy this requirement with some components of yk fixed, such as non-negativity
constraints x ≥ 0.
Polytope budget sets B need not be convex, and if some commodities are
discrete, they need not be connected. The convex polytopes Ck that are elements
of B need not be disjoint.
Any compact budget set B can be approximated arbitrarily closely (in the
Hausdorff set metric topology) by a polytope budget set B′. The argument is triv-
ial. A compact set has a finite covering by open neighborhoods of arbitrarily small
diameter. Just take these neighborhoods to be hypercubes. Then, their closures
are convex polytopes, and the closure of the covering is then a polytope budget set
B′ that contains B.
Corollary 2 Suppose S, U,M , andB satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 1, U(x; t)
is twice continuously differentiable in x,∇xU(x; t) is Lipschitz in t and∇xxU(x; t)
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is continuous in t. Suppose the B ∈ B are polytope budget sets, B = ∪Kk=1Ck,
with Ck a non-empty convex polytope spanning W k ≡ {x ∈ Rn|Qkx = wk},
where Qk is ik × n matrix of rank ik, and P kx ≤ yk with yk in a set Y k ⊆ Rjk
that has a non-empty interior, and let β denote the finite parameterization of B.
Then for almost all (m, y1, ..., yK) ∈ M × Y 1 × · · · × Y K , the demand corre-
spondence X(m, t, β) is a singleton that is continuously differentiable in (m, β)
and locally Lipschitz in t.
Remark We give an elementary direct proof of this corollary in the Appendix.
When U(x, t) is concave in x, a stronger assumption than we have used, the
methods of convex analysis can be applied to establish generic, but not almost
everywhere, regularity without our restriction to polytope budget sets; see Aubin
(1984), Dontchev (1998), Dontchev and Rockafellar (1996), Henrion (1992), Levy
(2001), Klatte and Tammer (1990), Magaril-Il’aev (1978), Robinson (1980), and
Scholtes and Stohr (2001).
Hausman (1985) discusses the stochastic specification and estimation of econo-
metric models with non-convex budgets, in particular those where the budget can
be represented as a finite union of convex sets. Blomquist and Newey (2002) pro-
pose a nonparametric estimation approach for the case of convex preferences and
convex and piecewise linear budget. Milgrom and Segal (2002) prove a general
envelope theorem and relate that to a range of economic models.
3 Demand generating functions
To guarantee that a demand system derived from a candidate demand generating
function is consistent with utility maximization, one must verify that the candidate
satisfies sufficient conditions to be derivable from maximization of some utility
function. The following result provides such conditions.
Theorem 2 (Converse envelope) Let V (m; t, B) be a continuous function on
M × T × B, that is convex, closed, and nondecreasing in m, where M is a
compact ball and B is a compact subset of the space of non-empty compact
sets in a convex body S ⊆ Rn+. Define X(m; t, B) = B ∩ ∂mV (m; t, B) and
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E(t) = ∪(m,B)∈M×BX(m; t, B). Assume that B ∩ ∂mV (m; t, B) is non-empty,
and that X(m; t, B) and V (m; t, B) satisfy the generating function fundamental
inequality (GFFI).
Then the function U(x; t) = inf{V (m; t, B)−m·x|(m, B) ∈M×B,x ∈ B}
for x ∈ E(t), and U(x; t) = −∞ for x /∈ E(t), is defined on S×T and continu-
ous on {(x, t)|t ∈ T,x ∈ E(t)}, and satisfies V (m; t, B) = maxx∈B(U(x; t) +
m·x), withX(m; t, B) as its demand correspondence. IfE(t) is full, thenU(x; t)
is continuous on S × T .
Remark The assumptions of Theorem 2 are conclusions of Theorem 1 when U is
quasiconcave. However, Theorem 2 does not guarantee thatE(t) is full or that the
utility it constructs from a candidate demand generating function is quasiconcave,
so these assumptions are not quite necessary and sufficient.
Lack of a palette of known functions V and composition rules for these func-
tions are a practical limitation to the use of this theorem to construct utility-
consistent demand systems for nonlinear budget sets. For the current general
case, the following results will be somewhat useful in applications such as demand
for goods with block rate tariffs, and labor supply in response to progressive tax
rates. For B ∈ B, define the support function s(p, B) = maxx∈B p · x. Then
for 0 6= p ∈ Rn, {x ∈ Rn|p · x ≤ s(p, B)} is a supporting half-space. If B is
convex, then it is the intersection of its supporting half-spaces. Let w(t,p, y) =
maxx{U(x; t)|p · x ≤ y} denote the indirect utility function of the base utility
function U(x; t). The following corollaries relate demand generating functions to
conventional indirect utility functions; establish that V exhibits a quasiconvexity
property with respect to unions of sets in B which in the case of linear budget
constraints implies the conventional quasiconvexity of the indirect utility function
in income and prices; and give further composition rules.
Corollary 3 Suppose U(x; t) is non-decreasing and locally nonsatiated in x, and
w(t,p, y) is its indirect utility function. The indirect utility function of U(x; t) +
m · x for m ≥ 0 is
v(m, t,p, y) = max
{
min
p′
w
(
t,p′, y ·
∑
j
θjp
′
j/pj
)
+ y ·
∑
j
θjmj/pj
∣∣∣∣θj ≥ 0,∑
j
θj = 1
}
.
11
IfU is homogeneous of degree one, and e(t,p) = min{p·x|U(t,x) ≥ 1} is its
unit expenditure function, then v(m, t,p, y) = y ·minp′ maxj(p′j/e(p′)+mj)/pj.
Corollary 4 If B ∈ B is convex with support function s(p, B), then for m ≥
0, V (m; t, B) ≤ minp∈Rn+ v(m, t,p, s(p;B)). If in addition, U(x; t) is non-
decreasing, locally nonsatiated, and quasiconcave in x, then
V (m; t, B) = min
p∈Rn+
v(m, t,p, s(p;B)).
Corollary 5 (Composition) Demand generating functions combine under the fol-
lowing rules.
(1) IfB,B′, B′′ ∈ B andB ⊆ B′∪B′′, then V (m, t, B) ≤ max{V (m, t, B′), V (m, t, B′′)}.
(2) If Bj ∈ B for j in an arbitrary index set J , and B = ∪j∈JBj ∈ B, then
V (m, t, B) = supj∈J V (m, t, B
j).
(3) Suppose Mi is compact ball in Rni+ and Bi is a subset of the family of non-
empty compact sets in Rni for i = 1,2. Suppose that Vi : Mi × T × Bi → R are
demand generating functions. Then, V (m1,m2; t, B1 × B2) = V1(m1, t, B1) +
V2(m2, t, B2) is a demand generating function on M1 ×M2 × T × B1 × B2.
(4) IfB ∈ B is written as a union over an index set J of convex subsetsBj that
are also in B and if U is non-decreasing, locally non-satiated, and quasiconvex,
then V (m; t, B) = supj∈J V (m; t, Bj) = supj∈J minp v(m, t,p, s(p;Bj)).
Remark Corollary 3 gives the relationship between the indirect utility functions
of the base utility and the perturbed utility. While this is not in general useful
for construction, it reduces to a practical formula in the special case of homoth-
etic preferences with a utility representation that is homogeneous of degree one.
In Corollary 4, if B is a convex polytope, then it is sufficient in the definition
of V (m; t, B) to consider only convex combinations of the vectors p that are
outward normals to maximal facets of B. An example of a demand generating
function of closed form that might be utilized in Corollary 4 is v(m, t,p, y) =
1
2
m>Cm − 1
2
(max(0,p>Cm − y))2/p>Cp, where C is a positive definite ma-
trix; this is associated with the quadratic utility m · x − 1
2
x>C−1x, and range
restrictions on m and y are required for the utility function to be nondecreasing
and locally nonsatiated and for demands to be non-negative.
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Remark The demand generating function can be used in welfare calculus to de-
termine the net benefit from a policy change, with the net welfare gain (in utiles)
from a move from (t′, B′) to (t′′, B′′) equal to V (m, t′′, B′′)−V (m, t′, B′). Nor-
malizing the utile difference by a marginal utility of money gives a measure that
corresponds to Hicksian consumer surplus.
4 Integrability of demand
We now seek conditions on the demand correspondence X(m; t, B) that guaran-
tee that it can be rationalized by utility U(x; t) + m · x maximized over the set
B.
If X is the demand correspondence of a utility maximizing consumer and
X (m; t, B) ∩ B′ 6= ∅ then budget B′ may be revealed preferred to budget B.
Define then for any given demand correspondence a set L consisting of all finite
sequences of (m,x) that connect in a finite number of steps from a given pair
(ma, Ba) to another pair
(
mb, Bb
)
with xj ∈ X (mj; t, Bj) ∩Bj+1 in each step.
L
(
ma, Ba,mb, Bb
)
=
{ (
x0, ...,xJ−1,m0, ...,mJ−1
) |1 ≤ J <∞,m0 = ma,mJ = mb,
B0 = Ba, BJ = Bb,∀j < J : xj ∈ X (mj; t, Bj) ∩Bj+1
}
The sets L are convenient in the formulation of the following result.
Theorem 3 (Integrability of demand) Let X (m; t, B) : S × T × B be an up-
per hemicontinuous compact-valued correspondence satisfying the ACCM and
with X (m; t, B) ⊆ B. Assume there exists (m∗, B∗) ∈ M × B such that
B = {B ∈ B|∃m ∈M : L (m∗, B∗,m, B) ∪ L (m, B,m∗, B∗) 6= ∅} . Define
V 1 (m; t, B) = sup
{
J−1∑
j=0
(
mj+1 −mj) · xj| (x0, ...,xJ−1,m0, ...,mJ−1) ∈ L (m∗, B∗,m, B)} ,
V 2 (m; t, B) = sup
{
J−1∑
j=0
(
mj+1 −mj) · xj| (x0, ...,xJ−1,m0, ...,mJ−1) ∈ L (m, B,m∗, B∗)}
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and V (m; t, B) = max{V 1(m; t, B),−V 2(m; t, B)}. Then V (m; t, B) > −∞,
and X (m; t, B) ⊆ B ∩ ∂mV (m; t, B). Assume further that X (m; t, B) = B ∩
∂mV (m; t, B) and that V is continuous on M × T × B. Then V satisfies the
conditions of Theorem 2.
Remark Recall that Theorem 2 establishes the existence of perturbed utility hav-
ing V is its DGF and hence rationalizing the demand X . As was also remarked
after Theorem 2, the condition that X (m; t, B) = B ∩ ∂mV (m; t, B) is a con-
clusion of Theorem 1 when U is quasiconcave.
Theorem 3 supposes that for any B ∈ B there is an m ∈ M and a path in L
connecting (m, B) to (m∗, B∗). This condition may be relaxed, for example if
B can be divided into subsets where the budgets only overlap within subsets and
where the subsets may be separated by open sets. In such a case, the Theorem
could be used to construct DGF separately for each subset with corresponding
utilities for each of these islands.
5 Example - Gorman polar form
Suppose base preferences are described by a Gorman (1961) polar form: U(x; t)
is obtained from a neoclassical indirect utility function
v(p, y, t) =
y − C (p; t)
A(p; t)
,
where committed expenditure C(p; t) and the price index A(p; t) are concave,
non-decreasing, and linear homogeneous in p. Then,
U(x; t) = min
p
{
x · p− C(p; t)
A(p; t)
}
.
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From this base utility, and for a convex compact budgetB the perturbed consumer
DGF is
V (m; t, B) = max
x∈B
{U(x; t) + m · x}
= max
x∈B
min
p
{
x ·
(
m +
p
A(p; t)
)
− C (p; t)
A(p; t)
}
.
But the function x ·
(
m + p
A(p;t)
)
− C(p;t)
A(p;t)
is linear, hence concave, in x and so
long as p · x > C(p; t), quasi-convex in p. Then by the Sion (1958) saddle point
theorem, the max and min can be reversed, giving
V (m; t, B) = min
p
{
R
(
m +
p
A(p; t)
;B
)
− C (p; t)
A(p; t)
}
,
where R(p;B) = maxx∈B{p · x} is the convex linear homogeneous maximum
revenue function for B.
Then, a practical way to generate the demand systems from nonlinear budgets
is to first specify the Gorman committed expenditure functionC(p; t), and second
to calculate the revenue functionR(p;B). The next step is to compute V (m; t, B)
by minimizing R(m + p/A(p; t);B) − C(p/A(p; t); t) in p. If the committed
expenditure function is piecewise linear, the price index A(p) is linear, and B is
a convex polytope budget set, then the third stage is a finite (linear programming)
calculation. Finally, for budgets that are unions of convex budgets, B = ∪jBj ,
the DGF is the maximum of the DGF over the convex budgets V (m; t, B) =
maxj V (m; t, Bj) (Corollary 5).
6 Conclusion
This paper has contributed by characterizing demands and demand generating
functions that are consistent with maximization of linearly perturbed utility under
general compact, not necessarily convex budgets. Results are provided to assist
the development of such models for applications.
The demand generating function defined and characterized in this section takes
a particularly simple form in applications with discrete budget sets. Suppose S is
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the set of vertices of the unit simplex in Rn, and B is any non-empty subset of
these points. Suppose U(x; t) : S × T → R is a continuous utility function
that is random, reflecting unobserved heterogeneity across consumers. Consider
the demand generating function V (m; t, B) = maxx∈B{U(x; t) + m · x}. If
the distribution of utilities is absolutely continuous, so that the probability of ties
is zero, then with probability one, its subdifferential ∂mV (m; t, B) is a unique
utility-maximizing vertex of B. Hence, the expected demand generating function
EV (m; t, B) has a differential ∂mEV (m; t, B) whose components are the prob-
abilities that each of the alternatives in B will be chosen. Fosgerau et al. (2010)
elaborates the properties of such choice probability generating functions.
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A Proofs
Lemma 1 Let m be contained in the closed ball M = {m ∈ Rn|‖m‖ ≤ c} for
some c > 0. If U(x; t) +m · x is quasiconcave in x for all m and c is sufficiently
large, then U(x; t) and U(x; t) + m · x are concave in x.
Proof. Suppose U(x; t) +m ·x is quasiconcave in x for all m ∈M . For x′ 6= x′′
and θ ∈ (0, 1), define xθ = θx′ + (1− θ)x′′. Then
U(xθ, t) + m · xθ ≥ min{U(x′; t) + m · x′, U(x′′; t) + m · x′′},
implying
U(xθ, t)− θU(x′, t)− (1− θ)U(x′′, t)
≥ min{(1− θ)(U(x′, t)− U(x′′, t) + m · (x′ − x′′)), θ(U(x′′, t)− U(x′, t) + m · (x′′ − x′))}.
Take m = −(x′ − x′′)(U(x′, t) − U(x′′, t))/‖x′ − x′′‖2 to obtain U(xθ, t) −
θU(x′, t) − (1 − θ)U(x′′, t) ≥ 0. When the ball M is of sufficient radius to
contain all such m, the inequality proves that U(x, t) is concave in x. Since the
sum of concave functions is concave, U(x, t) + m · x is concave in x.
For more general theory of quasiconcave sums, see Crouziex and Lindberg
(1986).
Proof of Theorem 1. The conclusions of this theorem are well-known with
standard proofs in the linear budget case, and the extension to demand generating
functions in the case of nonlinear budgets is straightforward. However, for com-
pleteness we give a full proof. It has already been shown, in the text preceding the
statement of this theorem, the [Cond. V] claim that V and X satisfy GFFI, and
hence the [Cond. X] claim that X satisfies the ACCM.
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Since B is a metric space with the Hausdorff set metric, the Berge maximum
theorem (AB 17.31) and AB 17.35(2) establish that X(m; t, B) is a compact-
valued, upper hemicontinuous correspondence from M ×T ×B into S and that V
is continuous in its arguments. The correspondence E(t) is compact-valued (AB
17.8) and upper hemicontinuous.
Suppose m0 = θm′ + (1 − θ)m′′ for some 0 < θ < 1,x0 ∈ X(m0; t, B).
Then V (m′; t, B) ≥ U(x0; t) + m′ · x0 and V (m′′; t, B) ≥ U(x0; t) + m′′ · x0,
implying θV (m′; t, B)+(1−θ)V (m′′; t, B) ≥ U(x0; t)+m0 ·x0 = V (m0; t, B),
proving convexity. If mj → m0 and xj ∈ X(mj; t, B), by upper hemicontinu-
ity there exists a subsequence (retain notation) xj → x0 ∈ X(m0; t, B). Then
V (mj; t, B) ≥ U(x0; t, B) + mj · x0 → V (m0; t, B), proving that the epi-
graph of V is closed. If m′ ≥ m′′ and x′′ ∈ X(m′′; t, B), then V (m′, t, B) ≥
U(x′′; t) + m′ · x′′ ≥ U(x′′; t) + m′′ · x′′ = V (m′′; t, B), proving that V is
nondecreasing in m, completing the proof of [Cond. V].
The convexity and closure of V inm implies that the subdifferential ∂mV (m; t, B)
exists and is non-empty, convex-valued, and compact-valued (AB 7.13). If (mj; tj, Bj)→
(m0; t0, B0),xj ∈ ∂mV (mj; tj, Bj), and xj → x0, then for eachm′, V (m′; tj, Bj)−
V (mj; tj, Bj) ≥ xj · (m′ − mj), implying by continuity that V (m′; t0, B0) −
V (m0; t0, B0) ≥ x0 · (m′ − m0); then ∂mV is upper hemicontinuous. If x ∈
X(m; t, B), then V (m′; t, B) ≥ U(x; t)+m′·x and V (m; t, B) = U(x; t)+m·x
imply V (m′; t, B) − V (m; t, B) ≥ x · (m′ − m), and hence X(m; t, B) ⊆
∂mV (m; t, B). Since ∂mV (m; t, B) is convex, [X(m; t, B)] ⊆ ∂mV (m; t, B).
Suppose x∗ ∈ ∂mV (m; t, B) \ [X(m; t, B)]. Then there exists a separating
hyperplane with normal q satisfying q · x∗ > q · x for all x ∈ X(m; t, B).
Also, V (m + λq; t, B) − V (m; t, B) ≥ λq · x∗. Consider λ ↓ 0, and xλ ∈
X(m+λq; t, B). Then, V (m; t, B)−V (m+λq; t, B) ≥ −λq·xλ. Adding these
inequalities, 0 ≥ λq · (x∗ − xλ). There exists a subsequence (retain notation) of
xλ that converges to a point x0, which by upper hemicontinuity of X is contained
in X(m; t, B). Then, q · x∗ ≤ q · x0, a contradiction. Hence, ∂mV (m; t, B) =
[X(m; t, B)]. Then x ∈ [X(m; t, B)]∩B can be written as a convex combination
x =
∑n
j=0 θjx
j of points xj ∈ X(m; t, B), so U(xj; t) + m · xj is the same
for all j. If U is quasiconcave, then U(x; t) + m · x ≥ minj(U(xj; t) + m ·
xj) ≡ ∑nj=0 θj(U(xj; t) + m · xj), implying x ∈ X(m; t, B). Finally if, in
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addition to quasiconvexity of U , B is convex, then [X(m; t, B)] ⊆ B, implying
that [X(m; t, B)] = X(m; t, B)) = ∂mV (m; t, B).
The almost everywhere twice continuous differentiability of V in m, with a
symmetric positive semidefinite second derivative, is established by Alexandroff
(1939); see also Rockafellar (1970), Howard (1998, Theorem 7.1), and AB 7.25
& 7.28. Then, X(m; t, B) is almost everywhere (in m) a singleton that is contin-
uous and continuously differentiable with∇mX(m; t, B) symmetric and positive
semidefinite.
Proof of Corollary 1. Let λ be the Lipschitz constant for U , and let it also bound
S. If Bk → B0, tk → t0,mk → m0, xk is a maximand of U(x, tk) + mk · x
on Bk, xk0 is a point in Bk closest to x0, and x0k is a point in B0 closest to
xk, then V (mk; tk, Bk) = U(xk; tk) + mk · xk ≥ U(xk0; tk) + mk · xk0 ≥
U(x0; t0)+m0 ·x0−λ(η(tk, t0)+h(Bk, B0)+‖mk−m0‖) = V (m0, t0, B0)−
λ(η(tk, t0)+h(Bk, B0)+‖mk−m0‖) and V (m0; t0, B0) = U(x0, t0)+m0·x0 ≥
U(x0k, t0)+m0 ·x0k ≥ V (mk; tk, Bk)−λ(η(tk, t0)+h(Bk, B0)+‖mk−m0‖).
Then V is Lipschitz in its arguments.
Proof of Corollary 2. For each (t, β), Theorem 1 applied to a single convex poly-
tope Ck in the union that forms B establishes that the maximand correspondence
Xk(m, t, βk) is for almost every m ∈ M , say m0, a singleton that is continuous
and continuously differentiable in m at m0. Define the Lagrangian
L(x, t,m, βk, λ, µ) = U(x, t) + m0 · x + (wk −Qkx)>λk + (yk − P kx)>µk.
By the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Theorem applied to maximization of a continu-
ously differentiable function subject to linear constraints, at (x0,m0, t, βk) there
exist multipliers λk0 and µk0 such that the following Lagrangian necessary (local
KKT) conditions hold; see Eustaquiro et al. (2007, Theorem 3.3), for a simple
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polar cone proof of this standard result.
∇xU(x0, t) + m0 −Qk>λk0 − P k>µk0 = 0
wk −Qkx0 = 0
yk − P kx0 ≥ 0
µk0 ≥ 0
(yk − P kx0)>µk0 = 0
The convex polytope Ck is the union of a finite number of facets, each defined as
the set of x satisfyingQkx = wk, P k1 x = y
k
1 , and P
k
2 x < y
k
2 , where P
k = [P k1
...P k2 ]
is a partition of the columns of P k, yk is partitioned commensurately, Qk is ikn,
and P k1 is rk × n. By construction, Qk> is of full column rank. If [Qk>
...P k>1 ] is
not of full column rank, then there exists a further partition [Qk>
...P k>11
...P k>12 ] such
that [Qk>
...P k>11 ] is of full column rank and P
k>
12 = Q
k>Λ + P k>11 Γ for some linear
combinations Λ, Γ. Pre-multiply this equality by x> for any x in the relative
interior of the facet to obtain yk>12 = w
k>
12 Λ + y
k>
11 Γ. Then, the set of y
k ∈ Y k such
that [Qk>
...P k>1 ] is not of full column rank is contained in an affine subspace of Rjk
of dimension less than jk, and hence of Lebesgue measure zero. This is true for
each facet, implying that except for a set of yk ∈ Y k of Lebesgue measure zero,
the active constraints Qkx = wk and P k1 x = y
k
1 at any x ∈ Ck will satisfy the
linear independence constraint qualification that [Qk>
...P k>1 ] is of full column rank
ik+rk. Then the system of equations∇xU(x0; t)+m0 = [Qk>...P k>][λk0>...µk0>]>
has a unique solution λk0 = Λk(m; t, βk) and µk0 = Γk(m; t, βk), with µk02 = 0,
in a neighborhood of m0, and this solution is locally continuously differentiable
in m. Then, the KKT conditions are differentiable in m at m0 and satisfy∇xxU(X
k(m; t, βk); t) −Qk> −P k>1
−Qk 0ikik 0ikrk
−P k1 0rkik 0rkrk

∇mX
k(m; t, βk)
∇mΛk(m; t, βk)
∇mΓk1(m; t, βk)
 =
−Inn0ıkn
0rkn
 ,
where ik is the number of rows of Qk, and rk is the number of rows of P k1 . The
existence of the derivatives then implies that the bordered hessian on the left-hand-
side of these linear equalities is non-singular. Therefore, differentiating the KKT
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conditions with respect to ykj for an active constraint j gives∇xxU(X
k(m; t, βk); t) −Qk> −P k>1
−Qk 0ikik 0ikrk
−P k1 0rkik 0rkrk


∇ykjXk(m; t, βk)
∇ykj Λk(m; t, βk)
∇ykj Γk1(m; t, βk)
 =
 0n10ık1
−1rk,j
 ,
where 1rk,j is an rk × 1 unit vector with a one in the jth component, and differen-
tiating with respect to the associated column j in P k1 gives∇xxU(X
k(m; t, βk); t) −Qk> −P k>1
−Qk 0ikik 0ikrk
−P k1 0rkik 0rkrk


∇Pk1 jXk(m; t, βk)
∇Pk1 jΛk(m; t, βk)
∇Pk1 jΓk1(m; t, βk)
 =
 In,jΓ
k
1( t, β
k)>
0ıkrk
Xkj (m; t, β
k)Irkrk

Hence, all the derivatives in the linear equalities above exist and are continuous at
m0. Analogous formulas hold for derivatives with respect to wk and columns of
Qk. The inactive constraints have∇Pk2 jXk(m; t, βk) ≡ 0.
Finally, consider a shift from t to t′. The KKT conditions in the two cases are
∇xU(x0; t) + m0 −Qk>λk0 − P k>1 µk01 = 0 ∇xU(x′; t′) + m0 −Qk>λk′ − P k>1 µk′1 = 0
wk −Qkx0 = 0 wk −Qkx′ = 0
yk1 − P k1 x0 = 0 yk1 − P k1 x′ ≥ 0
µk01 ≥ 0 µk′1 ≥ 0
yk2 − P k2 x0 < 0 (yk1 − P k1 x′)>µk′1 = 0
where P k1 corresponds to the active constraints at x
0. For small changes in t,
no previously inactive constraints can become active. Some previously active
constraints can become inactive, but that is accommodated in the KKT conditions
by making the corresponding components of µk′1 zero. The assumption that ∇xU
is Lipschitz in t implies ∇xU(x; t′)−∇xU(x; t) = O(η(t′, t)), where η(t′, t) is
the metric distance between t and t′. Then, differencing the KKT conditions,∇xxU(x
′′; t) −Qk> −P k>1
−Qk 0ikik 0ikrk
−P k1 0rkik 0rkrk

∆x∆λ
∆µ1
 =
O(η(t
′, t))
0ik1
0rk1

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where x′′ is between x and x′. As t′ → t, the upper hemicontinuity ofXk(m; t, βk)
implies x′ → x, and hence the bordered hessian remains non-singular for t′ in a
neighborhood of t. Therefore, ∆x = O(η(t′, t)), and Xk is Lipschitz in t.
Now considerB = ∪Kk=1Ck, andX(m; t, β) = argmaxk{U(Xk(m; t, βk), t)+
m ·Xk(m; t, βk)}. From the argument above, the linear independence constraint
qualification is satisfied at each x ∈ Ck on a set yk ∈ Y k of full measure. Ap-
plying Theorem 1, to B and to each Ck separately, the maximizers Xk(m, t, βk)
and X(m, t, β) are all singletons on a set of m ∈ M of full measure. Sup-
pose m0 is a point where all these maximizers are singletons. For each k, ei-
ther U(Xk(m0; t, βk); t) + m0 · Xk(m0, t, βk) < U(X(m0; t, β); t) + m0 ·
X(m0; t, β), in which case ∇βkX(m0; t, β) ≡ 0, or else U(Xk(m0; t, βk); t) +
m0 · Xk(m0; t, βk) = U(X(m0; t, β); t) + m0 · X(m0; t, β), in which case
Xk(m0; t, βk) = X(m0, t, β), since X(m0, t, β) is a singleton. The earlier argu-
ment establishes that each Xk(m0; t, βk) satisfying the second case is Lipschitz
in βk and t. Therefore X(m0; t, β) is Lipschitz in βk and t, and, by Rademacher
(1919) (see Howard, 1998, Theorem 7.1), is therefore almost everywhere dif-
ferentiable in β. This completes the proof that the maximand correspondence
is continuously differentiable in β and Lipschitz in t, almost everywhere (w.r.t.
M × Y 1 × · · · × Y K), in the case of a function U(x; t) that is twice continuously
differentiable in x, and a polytope budget set.
Proof of Theorem 2. From the convexity of V , ∂mV (m; t, B) is a convex-
valued upper hemicontinuous correspondence, implying that B ∩ ∂mV (m; t, B)
is an upper hemicontinuous mapping, assumed non-empty, that admits a selection
X(m; t, B) that is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence. The compactness of
M × B implies that E(t) is a compact-valued upper hemicontinuous correspon-
dence. Define U(x; t) = min{V (m; t, B) −m · x|(m, B) ∈ M × B : x ∈ B}
for x ∈ E(t), and U(x; t) = −∞ for x /∈ E(t). By the Berge maximum theorem
(AB 17.31), U is continuous for x ∈ E(t).
If x ∈ E(t), then by construction there exist (m, B) ∈ M × B with x ∈ B
such that U(x; t) = V (m; t, B)m · x ≤ V (m′′; t, B′′) −m′′ · x for all m′′ ∈ M
and all B′′ ∈ B that have x ∈ B′′. Taking B′′ = B, this inequality implies that
25
x ∈ B ∩ ∂mV (m; t, B) = X(m; t, B). Suppose x′′ ∈ B ∩ E(t). Then there
exist (m′′, B′′) ∈ M × B such that x′′ ∈ X(m′′; t, B′′). By Assumption (ii), if
x′′ ∈ X(m; t, B), thenU(x′′; t) = V (m′′; t, B′′)−m′′·x′′ = V (m; t, B)−m·x =
U(x; t), and if x′′ /∈ X(m; t, B), then U(x′′; t) = V (m′′; t, B′′) − m′′ · x′′ <
V (m; t, B)−m ·x = U(x; t). Finally, if x′′ ∈ B and x′′ /∈ E(t), then U(x; t) >
U(x′′; t) = −∞. Then, U(x′; t)+m·x′ is maximized inB at x′ ∈ B if and only if
x′ ∈ X(m; t, B), and maxx′∈B(U(x′; t)+m·x′) = U(x; t)+m·x = V (m; t, B)
for x ∈ X(m; t, B). Then, V is the demand generating function for U , and
X(m; t, B) is the associated demand correspondence.
Suppose tj → t0, xj ∈ E(tj), and xj → x0. The definition and upper hemi-
continuity ofE imply there exist (mj, Bj) ∈M×B with xj ∈ X(mj; tj, Bj) that
have a convergent subsequence (retain notation) to (m0, B0) ∈M × B, and x0 ∈
X(m0; t0, B0). Then U(xj; tj) = V (mj; tj, Bj) −mj · xj → V (m0; t0, B0) −
m0 · x0 = U(x0; t0) by the continuity of V , and U is continuous on S × T .
Proof of Corollary 3. Define U∗(x; t) = infp6=0 w(t,p,p · x); then U∗ is the
quasiconvex hull of U ; e.g., the upper contour sets of U∗ are the convex hulls of
the upper contour sets of U , and U∗(x; t) ≥ U(x; t). Define v∗(m; t,p, y) =
maxx{U∗(x; t) + m · x|p · x ≤ y}, and let x∗ denote a maximizer. Then
v∗(m; t,p, y) ≥ v(m; t,p, y), and there exists a linear combination x∗ = ∑nj=0 θjxj
of points xj (not necessarily all distinct) such that θj > 0,
∑n
j=0 θj = 1, and
U∗(x∗; t) + m · x∗ = U(xj; t) + m · xj . For at least one j, p · xj ≤ y.
Then, v(m; t,p, y) ≥ U(xj; t) + m · xj = v∗(m; t,p, y). Then v(m; t,p, y) =
maxx{infp6=0 w(t,p′,p′ · x) + m · x|p · x ≤ y}. Rewrite points in the simplex
{x ≥ 0|p · x = y} as linear combinations of the vertices y/pj to obtain the final
form v(m, t,p, y) = max{minp′w(t,p′, y ·
∑
j θjp
′
j/pj) + y ·mjθjmj/pj|θj ≥
0,
∑
j θj = 1}. When U is homogeneous of degree one with unit expenditure
function e(t,p), w(t,p, y) = y/e(t,p), and one obtains the simplified form
v(m, t,p, y) = y ·minp′ maxj(p′j/e(p′) + mj)/pj , where the order of minimum
and maximum can be reversed since the function is convex in p′ and concave in
x.
Proof of corollary 4. B ⊆ {x ∈ Rn|p · x ≤ s(p, B)} implies V (m; t, B) ≤
v(m; t,p, s(p, B)). If U is locally non-satiated and quasiconcave, any maximizer
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x∗ in B of U(x; t) +m ·x is exposed, and there exists a hyperplane containing x∗
that separatesB and the upper contour set of U(x; t)+m·x. If p∗ ≥ 0 is a normal
to this hyperplane, V (m; t, B) = U(x∗; t) + m · x∗ = v(m; t,p∗, s(p∗, B)).
Proof of Corollary 5. (1) If x ∈ X(m, t, B) and B ⊆ B′ ∪ B′′, then x is in
either B′ or B′′, implying either V (m, t, B′) ≥ U(x; t) +m · x = V (m, t, B) or
V (m, t, B′′) ≥ U(x; t) + m · x = V (m, t, B).
(2) Evidently, V (m; t, Bj) ≤ V (m; t, B) for all j. The set B is compact such
that V (m; t, B) = U(x; t) +m · x for some x ∈ B. Then there exists j such that
V (m; t, Bj) ≥ Ut(x; t) + m · x = V (m, t, B).
(3)
sup{U1(x1; t) + m1 · x1 + U2(x2; t) + m2 · x2|(x1, x2) ∈ B1 ×B2}
= sup{U1(x1, t) + m1 · x1|x1 ∈ B1}+ sup{U2(x2, t) + m2 · x2|x2 ∈ B2}.
(4) This result is an immediate consequence of result (2) and Corollary 4.
Corollary 6 Assume the conditions of Theorem 1. Let utility be written asU(x; t) =
ft(U0(x; t)), where for each t, ft is differentiable and strictly increasing. Then
U0 rationalizes choices at m = 0 and
0 = f ′t(U0(X(m; t, B)))∇xU0(X(m; t, B); t) · ∇mX(m; t, B)(1)
+m · ∇mX(m; t, B) a.e.(m).
Proof. For almost all m, X(m; t, B) is a singleton, ∂mV (m; t, B) = X(m; t, B)
and V (m; t, B) is differentiable at m. Differentiate the identity
V (m; t, B) = ft(U0(X(m; t, B); t)) + m ·X(m; t, B),
to find that a.e. (m)
X(m; t, B) = f ′t(U0(X(m; t, B); t))∇xU0(X(m; t, B); t) · ∇mX(m; t, B)
+X(m; t, B) + m · ∇mX(m; t, B).
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The conclusion follows.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let x ∈ X (m; t, B) and consider any m′ ∈ M ; then
V (m′; t, B) ≥ (m′ −m)·x+V (m; t, B) and henceX (m; t, B) ⊆ ∂mV (m; t, B).
It also follows that V (m′; t, B) > −∞ if V (m; t, B) > −∞ and by assump-
tion there exists such an m. By Rockafellar (1970, Thm. 24.8) and the fact that
S ⊂ Rn+, it follows that V is convex, closed, and nondecreasing in m. It re-
mains to show that X (m; t, B) and V (m; t, B) satisfy the GFFI. Consider then
x0 ∈ B1 ∩X (m0; t, B0) . It must be shown that
V
(
m1; t, B1
)− V (m0; t, B0) ≥ (m1 −m0) · x0
with equality if x0 ∈ X (m1; t, B1) . But if x0 ∈ B1 ∩X (m0; t, B0) then
V
(
m1; t, B1
)− V (m0; t, B0)
=
[
V
(
m1; t, B1
)− V (m1; t, B0)]+ [V (m1; t, B0)− V (m0; t, B0)]
≥ (m1 −m1) · x0 + (m1 −m0) · x0.
If also x0 ∈ X (m1; t, B1) then we obtain the reverse inequality and the desired
conclusion follows.
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